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abstract. It has been argued that there are obligations, or virtues and vices, that pertain uniquely to architectural practice. Thus 
Jack Sammons has argued that the moral failings of the Nazi architect Albert Speer were failings specific to him as an architect 
(qua architect). I argue that Sammons’ account misappropriates ideas about the virtues from Alasdair MacIntyre and for that and 
other reasons does not succeed. Nonetheless it may be possible to support the idea that there can be a specifically architectural ethics. 
I comment briefly on Heidegger’s notion of ‘dwelling’ in trying to indicate what might be involved in such an ethics.
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Theme of the issue “Architecture and the environment: ethical aspects”
Žurnalo numerio tema „Architektūra ir aplinka: etiniai aspektai“
unique architectural ethics
By devoting a discussion to ‘ethics and architecture’, 
we may seem to assume that there is something about 
being an architect, and/or something about architec-
tural works, that has per se ethical import, an ethical 
dimension, ethical “meaning”. There is, to be sure, an 
ethical dimension to any vocation or job, and any work 
product. It might be useful in some contexts to discuss 
ethics and selling stocks, ethics and ditch digging, ethics 
and (teaching) math. But in such cases, and many other 
such, we are unlikely to suppose that there is something 
intrinsic and unique to the activity that warrants ethical 
attention. A math teacher has many opportunities to 
do something right or wrong, virtuous or vicious; for 
example, he might assign a grade unfairly in order to 
extract sexual favors from a student. That action falls 
under various morally significant descriptions, but none 
of them make any essential reference to math, or to the 
teaching of math. The pertinent wrongness, or the vice, 
could just as easily be attributed to someone not en-
gaged in teaching anything at all. Thus, exploiting oth-
ers is wrong, and a disposition to treat others unfairly 
is a vice, and there are very many varying contexts in 
which such a vice might manifest itself.
But is there something contained in the work of 
architects that has an ethical dimension, no matter 
in what context they practice, something that arises 
only for architects, because of the very nature of their 
work? Some such idea has surfaced in a discussion of a 
particular architect (and that architect’s ouvre) widely 
regarded as a moral failure, namely Albert Speer. Most 
people presumably would assess Speer’s failure in a way 
similar to that I have chosen to describe the failure 
of my hypothetical math teacher; Speer seemed to be 
heedless of the impact his activities as architect and 
engineer were having on certain people. He seemed to 
be self-deceived with respect to his patron, Hitler. Such 
heedlessness and self-deception could have shown up 
just as well had he been in charge of, say, scheduling 
the Reich’s train service. Speer’s vices had nothing to 
do with being an architect per se.
The kind of account I’m attributing to ‘most people’ 
here, and that I am myself qualifiedly inclined to en-
dorse, has been contested in two ways that I know of: 
on the one hand, some have supposed that there is 
something intrinsic not so much to being an archi-
tect as to being a bureaucrat/technician, such as Speer 
was, someone with technical skills that could be put 
to a variety of uses, good or bad. This view is found in, 
for example, the discussion of Speer by Hauerwas and 
Burrell (1977). On their view, Speer’s moral failure is 
the consequence of being too completely absorbed in 
performing a technical function. He was a typical bur-
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eaucrat who ‘treats ends as given, as outside his scope; 
his concern is with technique’ as MacIntyre puts it in 
describing the managerial/technological modern type 
(MacIntyre 1984). That kind of failure is purportedly 
intrinsic to ‘the bureaucratic type’ or the ‘pure tech-
nician’. Some of Speer’s own remarks might indicate 
that he came to see himself in the light of this type 
of critique. The remedy would have been, he avers “… 
the self awareness of the individual human being as a 
counterpoise to technology” (Speer 1970). That is to 
say, the moral pitfalls that threaten a bureaucrat as he 
performs in accord with the technical requirements of 
a role can be avoided by revolting against that role and 
asserting oneself as an individual human being. But 
what sort of being is this ‘individual human being?’ 
Could it be a being who exists apart from all roles, who 
does not rely on any moral or religious or other cultural 
narratives to provide criteria for self- criticism? There 
are well known reasons which I will not rehearse here 
for denying that there could be such a human being. 
Apparently Speer did not see those reasons when he 
invoked the idea of the ‘individual human being’. But 
what moral sources were available to Speer?
On the second view, expressed by Sammons, moral 
sources could have been found within the practice of 
architecture itself. In order to show how, Sammons 
cites various misgivings that Speer had regarding the 
“Hitler style” that he adopted. That style ‘… was ‘pure 
“art of decadence”’(Speer 1970). How was Speer able 
to recognize this purported ‘decadence?’ Apparently 
by comparing the ‘monumental kitsch’ that he was 
producing to what he recognized, from his training 
and his immersion in the history of his discipline, as 
superior work, such as that found in the Escorial, with 
its “remarkable conciseness and clarity” (Speer 1970). 
Sammons proposes that Speer might have avoided his 
involvement with the ‘decadent’ third reich and its 
leader by taking more seriously what he knew as an 
architect (Sammons 2006).
 At first sight Sammons’ proposal seems most im-
plausible. Speer sounds like an aesthete. It is not difficult 
to imagine an aesthete who is aesthetically repelled by 
brutality but nonetheless contributes to it while holding 
his nose, so long as doing so permits the indulgence of 
competing appetites. Why should we suppose that aes-
thetic criteria (for example, “conciseness and clarity”), 
have any power to encourage or dissuade, except in an 
accidental manner, where moral strength is required, 
or indeed have any moral import at all? This question 
can be seen as simply one way of putting a classical 
puzzle about the relationships (or lack thereof) between 
art and morality. We cannot begin to answer it in a way 
relevant to the case of Speer without reflecting a bit on 
architectural aesthetics and ethics.
Ethics, aesthetics and architecture
Many of the standard problems in the philosophy of 
the arts arise with a vengeance in discussions of archi-
tectural aesthetics. What could it mean, for example, 
to say that an architectural work means something, 
makes a statement, represents, or expresses something 
(a feeling, a belief, a fact)? The parallels to music have 
often been noted, but the essential practicality of works 
of architecture generates a significant contrast with 
music. Musical works, and most other works of art, 
can be ignored in a way that architectural works make 
impossible by their practical functions. That fact may 
create an opening for a discussion within architectural 
aesthetics of the connections between ethics and the 
arts. The positions on this last problem range from 
the view that works of art, whether literary, plastic, 
or musical could not have any moral bearings, to the 
view, represented perhaps most famously by Tolstoy, 
that the moral import of artistic works, (where ‘moral 
value’ is included in the religious view of the age) is 
the only thing that matters. Tolstoy should be thought 
of as rejecting ‘aestheticism’ in the arts, a rejection 
required by his insistence that works of art ought to 
matter (Cavell 1976). On this view, works of art must 
be more than pleasing, more than decoration or aes-
thetic manipulation of the senses, and thus, a fortiori, 
if works of architecture are or can be works of art, 
they must be something more than ‘decorated sheds,’ 
no matter how ‘interesting’ the decoration might be 
(Harries 1997). The ‘something more’ might be spelled 
out in terms that carry moral or religious import. And 
in fact that is what was happening in the early 20th 
century.
architectural ideologies and ethics
The very first sentence of the Bauhaus program sets the 
tone; “...the ultimate aim of all visual arts is the com-
plete building,” a gesamtkunstwerk that will ‘...shine 
with its abundance of light into the smallest objects of 
everyday life”(Wingler 1978). This amounted to a “de-
claration of war on the decorated shed”(Harries 1997: 
329). All the arts had to be brought to earth, to every-
day life. Given such a demand “...the unavoidable en-
tanglement of architecture with the problems of living 
and dwelling that denies it the aesthetic completeness 
possible in the other arts becomes an asset that allows 
architecture to lead these arts out of their isolation... 
from life”(Harries 1997: 329, 330). A quasi religious 
view of life, a new secular religion, inspired Gropius 
and others. Gropius called for a “... rebirth [in archi-
tecture] of that spiritual unity which ascended to the 
miracle of the Gothic cathedrals” (Gropius et al. 1970). 
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But this ‘spiritual unity’ was not to be “religious” in 
the usual historical sense, but an expression of social-
ist solidarity and technological mastery. In that way 
architecture might come to be seen as having ‘ethical 
import,’ at least as that is understood in that broad, 
more or less Aristotelian tradition in which ethical 
reflection begins with a view to human flourishing 
within a vital polis.
Could it be that by taking more seriously what he 
understood about architecture and its history, Speer 
might have discovered moral sources that would have 
protected him from Nazi ideology? The quotes above 
from Speer evince the aesthete who finds certain ar-
chitectural styles to be vulgar. But such aestheticism, as 
already argued above, does not comport with any par-
ticular type of moral concern. Perhaps what is required, 
then, is something like what Gropius sought, an under-
standing of architecture as a source of spiritual unity.
 In fact Sammons does mention something along 
these lines, but the inspiration is, we might say, from 
the right, not the (socialist, internationalist) left that at-
tracted the Bauhaus followers. Speer’s mentor, Heinrich 
Tessenow, held to the idea that ‘... style comes from 
the people ... there can be no true culture that is inter-
national. True culture comes only from the maternal 
womb of a nation’(Sammons 2006). It is easy to see 
how such ideas might encourage rather than dissuade 
someone tempted by Nazism, and Sammons notes that 
indeed Speer and other students “saw parallels between 
Tessenow’s doctrine and the ideology of the National 
Socialists” (Sammons 2006). They had good reason to 
do so, despite the fact that Tessenow rejected the Nazis. 
The elevation of the “volk” and Herder-like ideas about 
the arts loom behind Tessenow’s remarks, and such 
ideas undoubtedly figured into the origins and con-
figuration of the Third Reich.
In fact, neither the left nor the right could be re-
lied upon to equip a person with moral depth. It is ap-
parent that both were likely to encourage shallowness 
and self deception or something quite a bit worse, as 
ideologies typically do. The program of the Bauhaus 
had, arguably, a socially manipulative aim hardly com-
patible with any view of morality that presupposes or 
requires individual freedom, and it was marked by 
arrogance. David Watkin traced a history of revolu-
tionary ideology in 20th century architecture charac-
terized by contempt for the past and tradition, and an 
extraordinary belief in the ability of the architect to 
discern the real needs of people and to transform life 
for the better accordingly (Watkin 1977). This is not the 
place to examine this ideology in detail, but to say even 
this much about it makes the practice of architecture 
in accord with Bauhaus-like ideals look like a very du-
bitable matter morally speaking. If there is any case to 
be made for a positive moral import to architecture, it 
will have to be made in other terms, taken neither from 
Tessenow, on the right, nor from the likes of Gropius 
or Bruno Taut on the left.
architecture, virtues and vices
In searching for that case, we can look again at some 
of Speer’s later misgivings about his work for Hitler. 
In describing the Escorial Speer remarked on the “... 
contrast with Hitler’s architectural ideas: in the one 
case, remarkable conciseness and clarity, magnificent 
interior rooms, their form perfectly controlled; in the 
other [Hitler] case, pomp and disproportionate osten-
tation”. (Speer 1970). Speer employs criteria remark-
ably reminiscent of those laid down for the designers 
of the Escorial. That work was the brainchild of Phillip 
the II of Spain, who gave instructions to his architect, 
Juan Buatista Toledo, directing that he should strive 
for “simplicity in the construction, severity in the 
whole, nobility without arrogance, majesty without 
ostentation” (el Escorial). Speer claimed that his own 
beginnings as an architect were consistent with the 
kind of modesty suggested in these remarks, but the 
“... estrangement from my beginnings was revealed in 
other ways than through the wildly excessive size of my 
buildings. They had become pure “art of decadence”. 
Wealth, the inexhaustible funds at my disposal, but 
also Hitler’s party ideology, had led along the path to 
a style which drew its inspiration rather from the show 
palaces of oriental despots” (Speer 1970). Sammons 
remarks on these developments thus; “He [Speer] did 
not just turn his back on reality; he brushed it away” 
(Sammons 2006). The implication is that if he had not 
done that, he would not have become Hitler’s architect.
Let us suppose that Sammons is right; a Speer who 
was true to the purportedly superior architectural 
ideals with which he began would not have become 
Hitler’s architect. Does that show that Speer’s moral 
failings were simply, or mainly, failings qua architect? 
A simple thought experiment might contribute to an-
swering this question. Imagine Speer with just one 
biographical variation; he had Phillip the II (in some 
possible 20th century version) rather than Hitler as his 
patron. Grant that then Speer might have stuck to his 
own style, since it matched his patron’s preferences, 
and ended up producing something like the Escorial, 
having been directed to produce ‘nobility without ar-
rogance, majesty without ostentation’. Would Speer 
have then been guaranteed freedom from his com-
plicity with evil? I do not see how. It is not just that 
the court of Phillip offered its own opportunities for 
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corruption, and that Phillip himself was no angel (we 
know what the low land protestants thought of Phillip. 
Pieter Breugel the younger aptly updated “the massacre 
of the innocents” in a painting with that title, in which 
Herod’s men are represented as Spanish troops engaged 
in their own version of ethnic cleansing). Give all due 
credit to Phillip’s taste. Does that necessarily guarantee 
absence of moral defects in his projects? No doubt the 
Escorial has merits the Zeppelinfeld lacks, but are those 
merits morally significant?
However, it might be replied that there are some 
moral overtones in the very language used here, in terms 
like ‘ostentation’, or ‘pomp’. Let us concede this point 
for the moment in order to examine more closely what 
those overtones might come to. Let us overlook the dif-
ficulties involved in saying just how a building, like the 
Zeppelinfeld, could be an expression of excessive pride, 
or an expression of anything for that matter. Sammons 
takes the ‘pomp’ and related characteristics of Speer’s 
work as indications of some kind of moral failing. What 
kind? It would have to be failure with respect to virtue/
vice. Excessive pride, hubris, is a vice. That vice could 
have been avoided if Speer had stuck to his own style. 
So the (moral) problem with Speer was that he did not 
do what being an architect could have taught him to do. 
That appears to be the gist of Sammons reasoning.
One obvious difficulty here is that virtue/vice 
concepts are concepts of multitrack dispositions in 
the agent, dispositions that show up in the various 
domains of a lived life, at home, at work, as a citizen, 
an artist etc. Thus they could not (logically) be dis-
positions that are unique to ‘being an architect’. Nor 
could they be acquired simply in that role. But there 
is a bit more to be said.
In his discussion Sammons draws upon that most 
eminent of recent virtue theorists, Alasdair MacIntyre. 
MacIntyre argues that the virtues are necessary for 
practices. A practice is a shared activity with agreed 
upon standards, rules, criteria of various sorts, in terms 
of which success or achievement in that practice can be 
measured. Medicine, the law, government, the various 
arts including architecture, games and sports, are all 
practices. Consider a game like chess. Achievement in 
the practice of playing is measured by standards in-
ternal to it. Only by following the rules of this game, 
learning strategies limited by those rules, by absorbing 
some of its history, can one achieve goods that cannot 
(logically or conceptually) be achieved in any other 
way. Someone might play the game for money and win. 
Money can be a good, but it would be a good external 
to the practice, and is a good that could just as well be 
achieved in other ways. It could be achieved in some 
other ‘game,’ or it could be achieved by cheating.
What does this have to do with the virtues? The vir-
tues, on MacIntyre’s account, are those traits of persons 
that are required for the goods internal to practices to 
be achievable. The person who refuses to cheat (the just 
person) even when the chance presents itself, makes 
possible, for himself and others goods that can only be 
achieved in honest playing of games, honest research 
in physics or medicine, honest conduct of public af-
fairs. The person in public office who risks her place 
(the courageous person) in promoting legislation that 
according to her lights will achieve some public good 
makes possible a good that is internal to a practice. 
Failures in these cardinal virtues of justice and cour-
age, on the other hand, lead to the decay of practices 
and the demise of traditions. For example, the dishon-
esty involved in biased testing of neuroleptics has, ar-
guably, caused a decline in the practice of psychiatry, 
and in achievement of its end, mental health.
How might this apply to the practice of architec-
ture? To begin with, what are the goods internal to the 
practice of architecture? Unfortunately any attempt to 
answer is likely to be highly controversial. Here we see 
another feature of practices that MacIntyre emphas-
ized, namely, that they have a history, and that history 
is often a history of conflict. There can be disagreement, 
within a practice, as to just what the standards are that 
constitute it at any point, as well as changes over time 
that reflect the working out of conflicts. But the changes 
are necessarily limited. The practice of the law, for ex-
ample, has changed amid conflict, but there could not 
have been conflict over whether or not laws should be 
subject to suspension in any circumstances at the whim 
of an executive. That would be, in an enlightening ana-
logy, a “game changer”. Accordingly, it should always 
be possible to distinguish internal from external goods.
Part of Sammons critique of Speer consists in bring-
ing out how external goods had replaced internal ones 
in his architectural career. It is not perfectly clear, but it 
appears that Sammons thinks that that fact itself shows 
exactly what Speer’s moral failings amounted to. Speer 
was like the legal “hired gun” who doesn’t care about 
justice so long as he gets paid. If Speer had the virtues 
necessary to sustain architectural practice, he would 
have stuck to his own style, and not submitted to Hitler 
for the sake of the power, etc. which doing so brought. 
So, what was wrong with Speer was that he failed to be 
a good architect.
This strikes me as very confused reasoning. Persons 
can fail in many different ways all at once. The thing 
that attracts attention to Speer is not just that he pur-
sued external goods at the expense of internal goods 
(a very common failing, it must be admitted) but that 
he pursued them by aligning himself with a notorious 
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criminal who was engaging in mass murder. That he 
did so shows dullness to character, or an exceptional 
degree of self deception, or a combination of these and 
other defects. Such lacks have no particular connection 
to ‘being an architect’.
Sammons might have avoided this flimsy critique 
of Speer if he had paid attention to more of MacIntyre’s 
discussion. MacIntyre always insisted that an under-
standing of virtues and vice in terms of practices was 
only very partial. In particular such an understanding 
cannot account for the place of the virtues in a “whole 
life”. The account in terms of practices does not work 
at all for such ‘whole life’ virtues as constancy and 
integrity (ManIntrye 1984). Integrity refers to con-
sistency with respect to the virtues throughout all 
aspects of a person’s life. It is a kind of master virtue. 
The attempt to understand Speer’s moral failings in 
terms of his lacks as an architect completely misses 
this. Speer’s life, not just his life as an architect, was 
deeply corrupted.
The ethical function of architecture
While the discussion so far may close the door on 
Sammons’ account of Speer’s failings, it hardly ends 
the discussion of the relations between architecture 
and ethics, or for that matter the discussion of Speer’s 
failings. Architects build places for people to live, work, 
shop, govern, display the arts, commemorate, study, 
worship etc. Where, how, when, out of what materials, 
can be ethically significant. Thus the architect might 
be thought of as having very particular obligations to 
build with a view to affordability, or environmental 
stability, or out of loyalty to a tradition, and so forth. 
Some of the obstacles to using the virtues/vices as an 
ethical ‘handle’ in thinking about ethics and archi-
tecture have already been addressed above, but there 
are other, act centered, approaches to ethics. Perhaps 
architects’ obligations could be understood in terms 
of utility calculations. Faced with the task of design-
ing and building, an architect might ask how what 
he does will produce the greatest happiness for the 
greatest number, or how it will maximize preferences. 
Alternatively, in some circumstances these obligations 
might be understood in more or less Kantian fashion, 
as strict duties. But the morally significant descriptions 
generated by these normative theories once again fail 
to locate anything unique to the architect’s work. Thus 
the architect who is wasteful (of materials, space, etc.), 
may fail utilitarian tests for ethical correctness, but 
what constitutes the moral failing is the wastefulness, 
and non-architects can be wasteful.
There might, however, be some cases where the 
good to be maximized in a utilitarian calculation is in 
a sense specifically architectural. Suppose that people 
take pleasure in certain styles of building, even if not 
consciously. Pleasure maximization has occupied (for 
better or worse!) a central place in utilitarian think-
ing. The architect who understands how to give that 
pleasure by virtue of her immersion in the history and 
techniques of her discipline, is, we might say, capable of 
a unique ethical function. But people take ‘pleasure’ in 
such a variety of things, a sweet orange, a Mozart son-
ata, the fulfillment of a duty (sic!). Mill quickly realized 
some of the deep difficulties in the concept of pleasure, 
and tried to avoid them by postulating a distinction 
between “higher” and “lower” pleasures. The higher 
ones might even include pleasure taken in the fulfill-
ment of a duty! Thus we run into a very characteristic 
problem in utilitarianism’s attempts to ground ethics, 
namely, the content of ‘utility’ may turn out to be norm-
atively loaded at the outset. To put it simply, it may turn 
out that what is ‘useful’ is what satisfies ethical norms 
that arise in human life independently of usefulness, so 
the utilitarian test may be useless (a very bad thing for 
anything utilitarian!). Related difficulties may arise for 
Kantian and other normative theories of ethics.
Modern moral philosophy, that is to say Humeian 
emotivism or expressivism in its many versions, 
Kantianism, and utilitarianism, have attempted to 
either ground most socially sanctioned norms, or show 
that there can be no such grounding. Difficulties with 
all of these views, including the one just mentioned in 
Mill, have induced some to deny that there can be such 
general theories of ethics. Thus some have endorsed the 
view that there are many irreducibly different ethical 
norms in different societies at different times. That kind 
of view tends to collapse into an incoherent relativism. 
Others have reacted by trying to recover some kind of 
natural law theory, or some account of the virtues that 
does not rely on discredited metaphysical teleology. 
Perhaps the most promising avenue here, particularly 
in the search for architectural ethics, would be some-
thing like a variant of the last two alternatives. What 
we need to find are more or less universal human traits, 
such as needs, desires, vulnerabilities, typical ways 
of experiencing self and world, that architecture can 
register or fulfill. We suppose a broadly Aristotelian 
framework, that is, we take it that ethics is concerned 
with conditions for the best kind of human life, and 
that it makes sense to speak of ‘human life’ in this way.
In 1951 Martin Heidegger gave a lecture to an audi-
ence composed mostly of architects, titled “Building 
Dwelling Thinking”. Characteristically, he appeals to 
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words and their histories in order to call attention to 
features of human life (dasein). Thus bauen (to build) 
has at its semantic core the idea of ‘dwelling’. ‘Dwelling’ 
names “the basic character of human being”, and should 
be understood in contrast to the idea of being cast into 
infinite space. It refers to human being ‘at home’ in 
the world, and is the ground of building (architectural 
practice) that confers a sense of place (Heidegger 1971: 
148). A sense of place is prior to abstract space in hu-
man experience. The word for space, raum, “... means 
a place cleared or freed for settlement and lodging” 
(Heidegger 1971: 156). Place requires boundaries, and 
in an obvious sense architects are in the business of pro-
ducing boundaries, walls, roofs, etc. Heidegger hints 
at ways in which they can do this that will arise out of, 
and contribute to, ‘dwelling’ and thus to human life. 
Architecture that does that is fulfilling a kind of ethical 
function. This is not the place to discuss in any detail 
what these ideas might mean, or effectively have meant, 
for architectural practice. That task is taken up in a very 
balanced and insightful way by Karsten Harries in his 
book The Ethical Function of Architecture, cited above. 
One feature of Harries account is a stress on human 
limits and vulnerabilities, to decay, passage of time, 
death, as also setting limits to architectural practice 
of a kind that could bring some human fulfillment. 
The positive significance of these ideas for architec-
ture is not easily or quickly stated, but it is a bit easier 
to indicate what is ruled out. Building that glorifies 
technology, building that claims to express and helps 
to institute gnosticizing claims about a new era freed 
from the limitations of the past, must be viewed with 
deep suspicion. And perhaps this takes us back to the 
moral failing of Speer, when his work is characterized 
(as it was by himself and Sammons) as guilty of hubris. 
The ‘pomp’ and ‘ostentation’ of his work were indeed 
incompatible with a practice of architecture that hon-
ors what is, on Heidegger’s view, most distinctive and 
necessary in human living. But, as Harries puts it (once 
again summarizing Heidegger), “the integrated life has 
to give birth to and cannot simply be generated by the 
architect’s work” (Harries 1997: 331). Speer’ s lack of 
integration was not and could not have been simply a 
failing qua architect. It was rooted in the general moral 
collapse of his life. Nonetheless, attention to good ar-
chitecture could play a role in articulating what that 
integration might have come to.
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